

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 SOE-02 AF-10 ARA-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-10
EUR-12 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03 NASA-01
NEA-11 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01 DOE-15
CEQ-01 OES-07 SS-15 ICA-11 ISO-00 /160 W
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P R 242009Z MAY 78
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8880
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION USNATO
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USMISSION GENEVA
USNMR SHAPE
CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG
CINC USAFE RAMSTEIN
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 09573

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, SALT, MBFR, MARR, MMOL, MNUC, GW, FR, UR
SUBJECT: GENERAL ANZEIGER INTERVIEW WITH CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDT, 24 MAY

1. THE MAY 24 ISSUE OF BONN'S GENERAL ANZEIGER CARRIED
AN EXTENSIVE INTERVIEW WITH CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT.
IN A LONG TOUR D'HORIZON SCHMIDT DISCUSSED IN SOME
DETAIL THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS CRISIS AS A RESULT OF
CONTINUING ARMS MODERNIZATION; MBFR; THE SALT TALKS;
THE FORTHCOMING UNSSOD AND THE GENERAL STATE OF EAST/
WEST RELATIONS. AS REGARDS DISARMAMENT, MBFR AND SALT,
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THE CHANCELLOR MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. DISARMAMENT: SCHMIDT RECALLED THAT THE FRG WELCOMED
AND SUPPORTED PROPOSAL TO CONVENE THE UNSSOD. HE SAID
THAT HE DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT THE CONFERENCE CAN OR
WILL LEAD TO CONCRETE AGREEMENTS DUE TO THE LARGE
FORUM IN WHICH IT IS BEING HELD. BUT IT WILL, HE FEELS,

COMPEL ITS PARTICIPANTS TO FRANKLY TO OUTLINE THEIR RESPECTIVE ARMS LIMITATION POLICIES, WHICH HE WILL DO AS WELL. SCHMIDT ADDED THAT HE EXPECTS THAT ANOTHER RESULT OF THE UNSSOD WILL BE A GREATER AWARENESS OF THE INDIVISIBILITY OF PEACE AND DETENTE. IN AN OBVIOUS REFERENCE TO AFRICA, SCHMIDT STATED THAT "THERE SIMPLY CAN BE NO MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, WHEN STATES MAKE AGREEMENTS REGARDING CERTAIN TERRITORIES AND INDIRECTLY WAGE WAR IN OTHERS."

3. MBFR: THE CHANCELLOR OUTLINED HIS OPINION REGARDING THE DATA DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA STRESSING THAT FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW THEY HAD GONE ON TOO LONG, BUT HAD AT LEAST CONTRIBUTED TO THE FACT THAT ALL SIDES WERE NOW BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THE IDEA OF BALANCE AND TO TALK ABOUT PARITY. THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS WERE REALISTIC AND AIMED AT BRINGING A NEW QUALITY INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. THEY CERTAINLY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES CONCERNED, BUT WOULD COMPEL CONCRETE REACTIONS AND ELIMINATE THE "EVERYTHING-OR NOTHING PROPOSALS," THAT HAVE NO CHANCE FOR ACCEPTANCE OR REALIZATION.

4. THE CHANCELLOR FEELS THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF TROOP AND TANKS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IF THE PARTIES CONCERNED REFRAINED FROM BEING OVERACCURATE. ASKED WHAT GOALS SHOULD BE CONFIDENTIAL

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SOUGHT AT VIENNA BEYOND DATA DECISIONS, THE CHANCELLOR REPLIED THAT HE WOULD FOCUS ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. RECALLING RESPECTIVE COMMITMENTS IN THE FINAL ACT OF THE HELSINKI ACCORD, SCHMIDT ADDED THAT THE PARTIES TO THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BINDINGLY COMMIT THEMSELVES TO ANNOUNCING LARGE-SCALE TROOP MOVEMENTS AND THE EXCHANGE OF MANEUVER OBSERVERS. AGREEMENTS TO THIS EFFECT COULD SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE TO THE OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS AND AT THE SAME TIME REDUCE THE DANGER OF SURPRISE ATTACK. THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD PARALLEL THE DATA DISCUSSION AND THOSE DEALING WITH THE WESTERN INITIATIVE.

5. THE CHANCELLOR REAFFIRMED THE FRG BASIC POLICY THAT FORCE REDUCTIONS HAVE TO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF PARITY, THAT THEY INCLUDE ONLY THE TOTAL STRENGTH OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AND THAT THEY MUST NOT AT THE SAME TIME IMPAIR THE RIGHT OF BOTH SIDES TO ORGANIZE THEIR DEFENSES AS THEY SEE FIT. HE ADDED THAT HE WANTS THERE TO BE NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT THE BUNDESWEHR WILL ALSO BE INCLUDED IN COLLECTIVE FORCE REDUCTIONS.

6. THE CHANCELLOR ADMITTED THAT THE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE VIENNA TALKS WOULD BENEFIT ONLY CENTRAL EUROPE AND THEREFORE WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO STABILIZE THE MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM IN ALL OF EUROPE. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE LONG RUN TO BROADEN THE GEOGRAPHIC

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AREA AND TO INCLUDE WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT CAN IMPACT FROM GREAT DISTANCES ON THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, SUCH AS CERTAIN INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES AND AIRCRAFT.

7. FRENCH DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL: ON THE SUBJECT OF THE FRENCH DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL THE CHANCELLOR SAID IT SIGNALLED AN ACTIVE FRENCH ENGAGEMENT FOR EUROPEAN ARMS LIMITATIONS. AND WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT FRANCE DOES NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE VIENNA TALKS, FRANCE WAS STILL

AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN EUROPE AND AN INDISPENSIBLE
GERMAN ALLY AND FRIEND AND THAT THE FRG WOULD NOT AND
COULD NOT AFFORD TO BE ESTRANGED FROM THE FRENCH IN THE
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FIELD OF ARMS LIMITATIONS.

8. SALT II AND III: THE CHANCELLOR OBSERVED THAT THE
FRG WOULD GREATLY WELCOME AN EARLY CONCLUSION OF THE
SALT II DISCUSSIONS, THOUGH IT WAS DIFFICULT TO PROPHECY
WHEN THEY WOULD END. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CHANCELLOR
RECALLED THAT AS A NON-NUCLEAR POWER THE FRG HAD A
CONTINUING INTEREST AND LEGAL CLAIM STEMMING FROM ITS
SIGNING OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

9. THE CHANCELLOR ADMITTED THAT EUROPE'S SECURITY
INTERESTS WERE PARTICULARLY AFFECTED BY THE WEAPONS OF
THE SO CALLED "GREY ZONE" WHICH WOULD BE DEALT WITH
IN SALT III. THE FRG WAS GREATLY INTERESTED IN A
SUCCESSFUL BEGINNING AND CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS ON
THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE WEAPONS HE HAD MENTIONED EARLIER
AND WHICH THE EUROPEANS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FRANCE
AND GREAT BRITAIN DID NOT POSSESS. HE HAD DISCUSSED
THIS MATTER WITH SECRETARY GENERAL BREZHNEV AS WELL,
WHO HAD BY NO MEANS DENIED THE NEED FOR SUCH NEGOTI-
ATIONS. IT WAS THEREFORE, POSSIBLE THAT THESE SYSTEMS
WILL BE NEGOTIATED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A SALT III,
THOUGH IT WAS NECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE, EMPHATICALLY,
THAT EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS CANNOT BE REACHED WITHOUT
FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN.

10. ERW: ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD ALSO INCLUDE THE
NEUTRON WARHEAD THAT HE SAID COULD BE USED NOT ONLY FOR SHORT-
RANGE TACTICAL WEAPONS, SUCH AS ARTILLERY, BUT ALSO
FOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS OF A LARGER EVEN GLOBAL RANGE, SCHMIDT
SAID THAT HE FOUND THE DECISION OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT
REASONABLE IN POSTPONING, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME NOT
FOREGOING PERMANENTLY THE PRODUCTION OF NEUTRON WARHEADS.
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THIS DECISION HAS GIVEN HIM FLEXIBILITY, AND LEEWAY FOR
FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE ARMS LIMITATION FIELD.

11. COMMENT. WE HAVE REQUESTED THAT FBIS TRANSLATE
FULL TEXT OF INTERVIEW FOR APPROPRIATE DISTRIBUTION.
WE ASSUME ADDRESSEES WHO ARE EXPERT ON ARMS CONTROL WILL

NOTE SPECIFIC POINTS OF INTEREST IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
AREAS. WHAT STRIKES US AS MOST INTRIGUING, HOWEVER, IS
THAT SCHMIDT MAKES FOUR SEPARATE REFERENCES, DIRECTLY
OR INDIRECTLY, TO RECENT EVENTS IN AFRICA, AND THAT HE
CLEARLY SUGGESTS THAT THOSE EVENTS COULD JEOPARDIZE
ARMS CONTROL BY DISTURBING THE BALANCE ON WHICH ARMS
CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE BASED.
STOESSEL

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Message Attributes

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